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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COLONIAL LEASING COMPANY OF 
NEW ENGLAND, INC., a Massa-
chusetts corporation, d/b/a 
COLONIAL-PACIFIC LEASING CO., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
LARSEN BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
CO., a general partnership; 
MICHAEL RAY LARSEN and JODY 
EARL LARSEN, individuals; 
MICHAEL RAY LARSEN and JODY 
EARL LARSEN partners in and 
doing business as LARSEN 
BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Case No. 19384 
Defendants-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages resulting from breach of an 
equipment lease (R-2-8). Upon motion by plaintiff-respondent 
Colonial-Leasing Company of New England, Inc., a Massachussetts 
corporation, d/b/a Colonial-Pacific Leasing Co. (hereinafter 
referred to as "respondent"), the Third District Court, Honorable 
Judith M. Billings presiding, granted summary judgment against 
defendants Michael Ray Larsen and Larsen Brothers Construction 
Co. (R-68-69). Defendant Michael Ray Larsen (hereinafter 
referred to as "appellant) appeals. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court granted respondent's motion for summary 
judgment (R-68-69). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the summary judgment granted 
below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 23rd day of September, 1977, respondent 
leased a crawler-loader on a 60-month lease (R-23, 25-26), 
Subsequently, appellant defaulted (R-23). Respondent repossessed 
and sold the equipment (R-23). The net proceeds from this sale 
were $6,000.00 (R-23). After crediting the proceeds of sale, 
appellant's liability to respondent was $27,716.10, plus 
attorney's fees and costs (R-23). 
The lease in question contains an integration clause, cf. 
paragraph 23 (R-26), and expressly requires the return of the 
leased equipment upon expiration of the lease term. Paragraph 12 
expressly provides as follows: 
POINT I. 
"Upon the expiration or earlier termination of 
this lease, lessee, at its expense, shall return 
the equipment in good repair, ordinary wear and 
tear resulting from the proper use thereof alone 
expected, by delivering it, packed and ready for 
shipment, to such place or carrier as lessor may 
specify."(R-26). 
ARGUMENT 
THERE ARE NO ISSUES OF FACT REMAINING SINCE THE 
EVIDENCE RULE BARS THE ALLEGED ORAL OPTION 
2 
PAROL 
AS A 
MATTER OF LAW AND RESPONDENT IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO 
AFFIRMATION OF ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. The parol evidence rule remains a matter of 
substantive law, this--Gourt's decision in FMA 
Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 E...:_ ~d 803 
(Utah, 1979) notwithStanding. 
The thrust of appellant's argument is that an alleged 
oral option to purchase creates an issue of fact reqarding the 
commercial reasonableness of respondent's disposition of the 
leased property under Article IX of the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code. In so arguing, appellant acknowleges that the written 
lease grants no such option and asserts that reliance must be 
placed on alleged oral representations made prior to the 
execution of the lease in question (R-56). Appellant has not 
alleged fraud. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the parol evidence rule 
operates as a matter of law to abort appellant's theory. This is 
true, respondent submits, under either Utah or Oregon law.l/ In 
Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 451 P. 2d 769 (1969), this 
court held that the defendant's affidavit created no issue of 
fact concerning oral conditions of performance where the 
agreement stated that it was the entire agreement of the 
parties: 
"We must agree with respondent that appellants are 
trying to vary the terms of the written agreement by 
l/The lease provides that the "legal effect of this lease shall 
be governed by the laws of the State of Oregon." (R-26). 
Respondent does not believe a choice of laws analysis to be 
necessary since it appears that the law of both jurisdictions is 
substantially the same. Respondent would suggest, however, that 
it would be inappropriate to develop "new" law for Utah on the 
basis of an agreement which references Oregon law. 
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parol evidence, i. e., to establish a different contract 
on facts known at the time of reducing their understanding 
to a written form. 
"* * * The rule is well settled that, where the 
parties have reduced to writing what appears tu be 
a complete and certain agreement, it will, in tt1e 
absence of fraud, be conclusively presumed that 
the writing contained the whole of the agreement 
between the parties, that it is a complete memorial 
of such agreement, and that parol evidence of con-
temporaneous conversations. representations, or 
statements will not be received for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of the written docu-
ment.** *'[Citing B. T. Moran, Inc. v. First Sec-
urity Corp., 82 Utah3T6, 329, 2~ 2d ~3sg­
(1933). )"[Emphasis supplied. I 22 Utah 2d at 254-255, 
451 P. 2d at 770-771. 
Similarly, in Ruff y_. Boltz, 252 Or. 236, 448 P. 2d 549 
(1968), the Oregon Supreme Court said: 
"The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law 
and will be applied whether or not objection is made to 
the admission of the evidence which violates the rule." 
448 P. 2d at 550. cf. Deering y_. Alexander, 281 Or. 607, 
576 P. 2d 8 (1978); Wall v. S. E. C. Co., Inc., 270 Or. 
553, 528 P. 2d 1054 (1978..,-:- - - - -- --
Along these same lines, this court in Overson v. United 
States Fidelity and Guaranty, 587 P. 2d 149 (Utah, 1978) adopted 
a line of cases from the State of Washington stating that: 
" .... 'Interpretation of a written contract is usually 
a question of law for the court. If its terms are clear 
and unambiguous, summary judgment is proper." [Citing 
Central Credit Collection Corp. y_. Grayson , 7 Wash. App. 
56, 499 P. 2d 57 (1972).J 587 P. 2d at 151. 
Subsequently, this court has affirmed the granting of 
summary judgment on several occasions by citing the rule of 
Overson v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty, supra. cf. Mason 
'!_.Commercial Union Assur. Companies, 626 P. 2d 428 (Utah, 1981), 
Boise Cascade Corporation, Building and Materials Distribution 
Division v. Stonewood Development Corporation, 655 P. 2d 668 
(Utah, 1982); Morris v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. ~. 658 P. 
4 
2 d 1199 ( Utah, 198 3 ) . 
Appellant seems to believe that this court's decision in FMA 
Financial Corp. ':'.'....:_Pro-Printers, 590 P. 2d 803 (Utah, 1979) 
creates an exception for leases from the rules of construction 
regularly applied to other written agreements. In that case, the 
lessor tried its case on the assumption that an option to 
purchase existed, even though none was stated in the written 
lease. After losing, the lessor appealed, attempting to raise 
the issue of the parol evidence rule. This court rejected that 
attempt noting that the lessor's own witnesses had acknowledged 
the granting of options to purchase as a matter of course. 
Respondent submits that FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 
supra, insofar as it relates to the parol evidence rule, 
constitutes nothing more than judicial recognition of the 
accepted rule of appellate procedure that a party cannot try a 
case on one theory, lose, and then appeal on another. cf. 
Guaranteed Food of Neb., Inc. ~· Rison, 207 Neb. 400, 299 N. W. 
2d 507 (1980). In the present case, the parol evidence rule is 
not new matter raised by a losing party for the first time on 
appeal. Therefore, the procedural rule of FMA Financial Corp. v. 
Pro-Printers, supra, does not apply and the lower court's 
granting of summary judgment should be affirmed by this court as 
consistent with established precedents of both Oregon and Utah 
law. 
s 
B. This lease is ~ ~ integrated agreement wh.1ch 
requires the lessee to return the equipment at the end 
of the lease term. Therefore, parol evidence of an 
option to j?"\lrChase has no ~ relevance- and 
respondent is entitled to affirmation of its summ~U'. 
judgment as ~ matter of law, 
The lease in question states, "This instrument constitutes 
the entire agreement between lessor and lessee .... " (R-26J 
Further, paragraph 12 of the lease requires the lessee to 
surrender the equipment on termination of the lease term: 
"Upon the expiration or earlier termination of this 
lease, lessee, at its expense, shall return the equipment in 
good repair, ordinary wear and tear resulting from proper 
use thereof alone expected, by delivering it, packed and 
ready for shipment, to such place as lessor may specify." 
(R-26). 
Appellant attempts by parol evidence to stand the written 
agreement on it's head. Not only, according to appellant, is 
there no agreement to surrender the equipment at the end of the 
lease term, there is in addition a contractual right of purchase 
at such time. All of this squarely contradicts the written 
agreement. For these reasons, the parol evidence rule operates 
as a matter of law to preclude any issue of fact regarding the 
existence of an option to purchase. Rainford v. Rytting, supra; 
Ruff~ Boltz, supra. 
Other provisions of the lease make it clear that ownership 
of the equipment is to remain with the respondent at all times. 
Paragraph 22 thereof expressly provides, "The equipment is, and 
shall remain, the personal property of lessor; and lessee shall 
have no right, title or interest therein or thereto except as 
expressly set forth in this lease." (R-26). And further, while it 
is true that, as appellant suggests, paragraph nine of the lease 
provides for renewal of the lease at the end of the initial lease 
6 
term(R-26), ~pon renewal the lessee must continue to pay the 
rentals required by the agreement. Indeed, pursuant to paragraph 
nine, the lessee never becomes entitled to retain possession and 
use of the leased equipment without making monthly rental 
payments. All of this is wholly inconsistent with appellant's 
theory of an eventual ownership right acquired through exercise 
of an alleged oral option to purchase. 
Appellant asserts in passing the existence of a custom and 
usage as a means of avoiding the parol evidence rule. However, 
there is nothing in the record to show that appellant had any 
knowledge of any custom or usage contrary to the written 
agreement nor any reliance on the same. Moreover, usage cannot 
contradict the express terms of a written agreement. Rest. 2d, 
Contracts, Section 221. 
In In Re Atlantic Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820 (N. D. 
Georgia, 1966), the Court concluded that the lease in question 
was a true lease even though the lease apparently did not direct 
the lessee to return the equipment at the end of the lease term. 
The Court found that an entire agreement clause together with a 
provision that the agreement was intended by the parties to be a 
lease formed a sufficient basis for the conclusive presumption of 
the parol evidence rule. In the present case, respondent 
presents an even stronger case for the application of the parol 
evidence rule since the disposition of the equipment on 
termination of the lease is expressly addressed. Therefore, the 
summary judgment granted below should be affirmed. 
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POINT II. 
Section 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS SET FORTH IN SECTION 70A-2-
201 ( l) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) AS AMENDED BARS 
ANY CONTENTION THAT THE LEASE HEREIN IS IN FACT AN 
AN AGREEMENT OF PURCHASE AND SALE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
70A-~-20l(l) Utah Code Annotated ( IYSJ) as amended 
provides that "a contract for the sale of goods for the price ot 
$500 or more is not enforceable by way or action or defense 
unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a 
contract for sale has been made between the parties .... " The 
application of this section to the present case is clear: 
Appellant acknowleges that the only writing present here is a 
lease, not a contract of sale, and that resort must be had to 
alleged oral representations to prove that a sale has occurred. 
Since there is no written contract of sale and the price of the 
goods would clearly be in excess of $500.00, appellant's argument 
fails as a matter of law. 
In Re Financial Computer Systems, Inc., 4 74 F, 2d 1258 
(1973) is squarely on point. Therein, the trustee in bankruptcy 
sought to enforce the lessee's rights under an alleged oral 
option to purchase. The District Court allowed him to do so. On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed on the basis of a California stat~ 
statute identical to Section 70A-2-201(1) Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) as amended. The lease in that case contained an 
integration or entire agreement clause and provided that at the 
end of the lease term, "Lessee will return the property to lessor 
in as good condition as received less normal wear, tear and 
deprciation." 474 F. 2d at 1259. The Ninth Circuit concluded 
that since the only written agreement, the lease, contained "no 
8 
mention of an option to purchase," Ibid., and "clearly and 
expressly [provided] for a straight lease with ownership 
remaining with [the lessor] at all times," Ibid., the trustee's 
attempted action was improper. There was no "writing sufficient 
to indicate that a contract for sale [had] been made between the 
parties .... · " 4 7 4 F . 2 d at l 2 6 0 . 
In the present case, there is no writing to indicate 
that a contract for sale has been made between the parties. 
Therefore, respondent is entitled to affirmation of its summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither Oregon nor Utah has created any special exception 
for leases from the parol evidence rule. Indeed, the general 
rule for equipment leases appears to be no different from that 
for other kinds of agreements: 
"Where a contract contains an 'entire agreement 
clause, · ... the general rule has been that such a 
statement is conclusive as to an integration." 
[Emphasis supplied.] Bender's Uniform Commercial 
Code, Section 29A.06[l](a]. 
Respondent submits that there is nothing in the present case 
to warrant any departure from the general rule. Appellant 
received a full and fair opportunity to present his defense. 
Indeed, at the hearing on respondent's motion for summary 
judgment the Court asked the appellant whether he had anything to 
add by way of allegation, fraud, and the appellant 
indicated that he did not (R-68). 
Moreover, the statute of frauds as set forth in Section 70A-
2-201(1) bars any contention that the lease in question is in 
fact an agreement of purchase and sale as a matter of law. 
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For these reasons, respondent respectfully submits thAt the 
judgment of the District Court in favor of respondent should be 
affirmed. ~ 
DATED this~ day of December, 1983 
By~~5~~< 
L. Edward Robbins 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Colonial-Pacific Leasing Co. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to the following individual, 
first class postage fully prepaid, this 4- day of December, 
1983: 
Mr. Royal K. Hunt, Esquire 
2030 East 4800 South, Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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